Clientelism

Clientelism offers us an explanation as to how the relationship between pressure groups and politicians operate. Clientelism states that the relationship is ultimately reciprocal and therefore of mutual benefit to both patrons and clients. Both politicians and the pressure group(s) concerned ultimately gain something from the link between them. For instance, one of the bundlers for Obama (Marc Benioff) chairs a company whose software his administration adopted for its federal agencies. On the Republican side, the chair of the Natural Resources Committee Doc Hastings received an amount of money from oil and gas companies in the run-up to the 2010 mid-terms. It should be noted that the Natural Resources Committee deals with petroleum conservation; and that Hastings blocked a Democrat-sponsored bill to enhance safety standards for offshore drilling. As with other theories and concepts within political discourse, clientelism is based upon certain assumptions that we need to identify.

Firstly, clientelism assumes that pressure groups possess a rational expectation from their contact with politicians. They assume that the provision of campaign finance will secure certain benefits to their members and cause. This might range from favorable legislation to generous levels of government subsidies. Clientelism also assumes that politicians seek to gain something from the relationship. This may take the form of campaign funds or an official endorsement. It may also result in a number of volunteers being recruited from that particular organization to help with voter registration. There is therefore an invisible contract between patrons and clients on the basis of shared benefits; both in an actual and a perceived sense. For example, a candidate from the Democratic Party might pledge favorable legislation for workers. In return, labor unions might provide funding and volunteers during an election. Leaders of such unions may also ensure that their members are registered to vote, as the majority of those who pay union dues tend to support the Democrats.

It is important to note that both sides must meet their mutual obligations in order for said relationship to develop. The relationship is also uneven in that clients may well have more than one potential patron. During an election campaign, wealthy donors and corporations can give their funds to candidates from both main parties. Indeed, some clients have a clear rational interest in providing funds to both sides because the outcome of an election can never be entirely certain. As such, it might be entirely logical for a pressure group to provide assistance to candidates from both parties (particularly when the election is likely to be closely contested). Either way, the winner of the election must recognize the obligation inherent within the relationship. If they do not, then they might fail to secure funding when they stand for re-election during a primary and/or a general election. In truth, this is the harsh reality of politics.

 

Many would claim that clientelism encapsulates the negative impact of pressure groups upon the political process, in that such groups may exert excessive influence upon decision-makers. However, the claim that such groups have an ‘excessive’ influence is difficult to properly substantiate because it is difficult to identify causality. In other words, politicians might adopt a particular line regardless of the support provided by certain pressure groups. One should also consider the counter-argument presented by the pluralist perspective; which states that the influence of one side of the debate is balanced by the existence of those groups that represent the alternative view. This is of course fully consistent with the broader ethos of a democratic society.