Fixed terms

                Although fixed terms are hardly unique to American elections, they remain one of its most well-known features. The obvious starting point relates to the Head of State, who can serve no more than two consecutive terms. This would normally equate to eight years. However, he may have been vice-president before winning his first election. As such, it is technically possible for a President to serve the best part of three terms as Head of State. The idea of placing a limit upon the duration of the presidency dates back to a convention set by George Washington. It later became a constitutional requirement after FDR broke the convention during the Second World War. Placing a limit upon power is consistent with the broader ethos of the founding fathers.

                Members of the House and the Senate do not face any such constraint. In rare cases, this has led to a member of Congress serving for a considerable length of time. For instance, Strom Thurmond stayed in his post until the grand old age of 101. John Dingell (D) of Michigan holds the record for the longest congressional tenure in history, having been a member of the House from 1955 to 2015. There have however been attempts to place term limits upon members of Congress. During the Republican Party’s ascent to power in 1994, term limits were a central plank of their ‘Contract with America.’ It was proposed that an incumbent would serve no longer than twelve years (two terms for a Senator, six for a House representative). However, the proposed constitutional amendment did not gain a sufficient majority. The proposal also faced opposition from the judicial branch of government, when the Supreme Court ruled against attempts by the states to impose term limits on congressional members in the case of US Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton (1995). Term limits do however apply to other levels of governance depending upon the state in question.

                The issue of term limits is a marginal one within American politics. Although the public dislike Congress, they often re-elect their congressional representatives from one election to the next. This apparent paradox is captured in the old cliché that ‘Americans hate Congress but love their congressmen.’ Secondly, elected representatives from both main parties have a clear interest in maintaining the status quo. This makes reform very difficult to achieve. Politicians may pay lip-service to the idea, but they are highly unlikely to support measures that undermine their power unless they truly have to. It must also be noted that the public (and pressure groups) are insufficiently motivated to demand such a radical change, placing a higher priority upon issues such as abortion and gun rights.

                A deeper exploration of fixed terms raises some intriguing questions. The first question seems the most obvious; ‘does it matter?’ The problem raised by an absence of fixed terms of course is that incumbents may become complacent. An elected member of the House, secure in the knowledge that congressional districts have been drawn for purely partisan benefit; may offer a poorer service to their constituents than an incumbent facing a genuine contest every two years. Such reasoning itself rests upon subjective opinion. Moreover, an incumbent always faces a number of factors that would prevent them becoming too complacent. For one, they could be found guilty of corruption via the House Ethics Committee. Secondly, they may be vulnerable to a challenger during a primary. Pressure groups will of course shine a light on their activities, and media scrutiny will always keep them very much on their toes. Moreover, some states even have recall elections, a procedure which goes some way towards addressing the democratic deficit. Taken together, the argument that an absence of fixed terms leads to complacent incumbents in Congress appears a little thin.

                Another argument to consider is that fixed terms would enable younger politicians to break through. Older politicians may well be seen as ‘bed blockers’ preventing the next generation from coming forth towards the congressional stage. Once again, this rests on somewhat shaky foundations. Younger politicians are not necessarily any better than those with more experience. Indeed, the public may prefer an old warhorse who knows how the game works in Washington DC. This was certainly true in South Carolina, where the aforementioned Strom Thurmond remained in his post for almost half a century. Nonetheless, the opportunities to break through into the federal legislature are by definition limited. Some level of staff turnover is needed in order for each generation to establish themselves in the rough and tumble world of congressional politics. Moreover, a legislature dominated by older members does not fully represent American society. This observation is central towards the resemblance model of representation.