The Cabinet

                The Cabinet seeks to co-ordinate the work of the executive branch of government. The main role of Cabinet is therefore to implement decisions reached amongst its members. The Cabinet is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President may choose his Cabinet members from a wide number of sources. For instance, he may recruit from Congress itself. Due to the separation of powers, a member of Congress must resign their position in order to join the Cabinet. As such, the President often has more chance of tempting a former member of Congress to his Cabinet than an existing member. State legislatures may also be considered here. Furthermore, the President may recruit members from serving or former state governors. This may well provide additional experience of governing to his Cabinet. From a similar angle, he may also recruit serving or former city mayors. The Cabinet may also consist of policy experts, figures from academia and prominent people aligned to the governing party or ideological cause.

                Unlike other comparable democracies, the President does not campaign on a shared platform with Cabinet members. He has no equivalent of a 'shadow' Cabinet, and the habit of co-operation it generates; that a British Prime Minister benefits from. Moreover, he has few sanctions available to ensure a coherent, disciplined approach. Given the weak nature of party labels within the states, the President may well face problems ensuring that the Cabinet maintains a shared platform. It must of course be recognized here that the Cabinet is a government of all the talents, rather than necessarily supporters from his own party. Indeed, it is customary for a newly-elected President to appoint or at least retain someone from the opposing party. When Obama took over in January 2009, he kept Robert Gates as Defense Secretary.

There are very few rules that limit what the President can and cannot do with Cabinet. For instance, the President can create new Cabinet departments (as in the case of the Department for Homeland Security in 2002 as a response to 9/11). It should also be noted that when appointing members to his Cabinet, the President usually seeks to reflect the diversity of the country. The aim is to create a Cabinet that looks like America in terms of social background. Barack Obama currently presides over the most racially diverse Cabinet in American history.

All Presidents have a tendency to work closely with a small circle of powerful figures. As such, some Cabinet members are of far greater importance than others. In terms of foreign policy, the Secretary of State and the Defense Secretary will always be major players regardless of which party occupies the White House. Similarly, the Treasury Secretary will always play a key role within any administration. However, it must be noted that the President will also receive advice from members of the EOP (such as the National Security Advisor over foreign policy and the Chief of Staff over a wide number of issues).

                The importance of the Cabinet as a collective body is marginal when compared to the EOP. For one, members of the Cabinet hold divided loyalties whereas members of the EOP do not. A Cabinet minister is always vulnerable to ‘going native,’ unlike those who form part of the EOP. Secondly, members of the EOP have a level of proximity to the President that members of the Cabinet might envy. As Daniel Moynihan (a member of four successive administrations) once said; “never underestimate the power of proximity.” Thirdly, members of the Cabinet are essentially specialists within their area. As such, Cabinet meetings do not necessarily generate much in the way of collective discussion or progress. Finally, the number of Cabinet meetings tends to decline as the President enters his second term. The media only really tends to focus upon Cabinet meetings at the start of the presidency, or at times of genuine national crisis. Although the Cabinet as an institution goes back to the founding of the Republic, its salience has diminished in comparison to the EOP. To give one particular instance, President Obama chose the EOP to drive through his bold health care reform as opposed to the Cabinet.

                It is revealing to note that members of the Cabinet itself do not necessarily view the body as particularly important. For some people, the offer of a Cabinet position may mean a loss of power. Indeed, a Senator may actually wield more power than a lower-ranking member of the Cabinet. In order to give up a congressional seat, the President will have to offer a tempting position to those who already have power. Hillary Clinton is a good example of this point. She was Senator for New York before accepting Obama’s invitation to take up the post of Secretary of State. Her successor (John Kerry) was also a former Senator.

Given the separation of powers inherent within the American system, Cabinet ministers hold little direct influence over members of Congress. During a period of divided government, relations between the executive and the legislature can easily turn sour. Furthermore, the fate of Cabinet ministers is not tied into the fate of the President. There is nothing comparable to say collective ministerial responsibility one might find in a parliamentary system of governance. The Cabinet is fundamentally a “team of rivals” to use a term popularized by Abraham Lincoln. As such, the President will have to be attentive to potential turf wars within the Cabinet, a point alluded to by the former Secretary of State for Defense Robert Gates when he left the Obama administration. There is for instance an obvious tension between the diplomats at the State Department and the hawks at the Defense Department. An effective foreign policy strategy requires a compromise between these two essentially contrary worldviews.

The Executive Office of the President

                This particular section concerns the federal bureaucracy under the immediate control of the President. There are essentially two elements to consider; the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and the Cabinet. The former is of much greater importance than the Cabinet, with successive presidents having often made greater use of the EOP than the Cabinet. This is an important point to grasp when considering the distinction between the two organizations.

                The EOP was created in response to the Brownlow commission (1937) which stated that the President needed help to perform his roles and functions. The EOP (sometimes known as the EXOP) is an umbrella term for those agencies that provide help, advice, co-ordination and administrative support to the President. The EOP consists of three main elements; the White House Office (WHO), the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). One might also include advisors in specific policy areas (such as the Council of Economic Advisors).

                Any proper assessment of the EOP needs to distinguish between the various agencies. Of these, the WHO is the most important. Firstly, its members consist of the President’s most trusted advisors. Regardless of the administration in question, the WHO will always form part of his inner circle. Members of the WHO (such as the Chief of Staff) may well have the President’s ear on important matters such as national security. Secondly, the WHO is effectively a gatekeeper between the White House and the broader federal bureaucracy. It thereby decides who will contact the President. It may also check paperwork before it reaches the President’s in-tray. In addition, the WHO draws up his daily schedule and organizes the management of personnel. The WHO is one of the largest elements of the EOP. In order to serve effectively, members of the WHO must have a desire for anonymity and should sometimes be prepared to tell the Head of State what he does not want to hear.

                The NSC was established in the early years of the cold war and its role could best be described as the ‘honest broker’ in terms of presenting information to the President from a variety of sources. The head of the organization (the National Security Advisor) often plays a crucial role in terms of American foreign policy. Given the salience of foreign policy to the powers of the President, the NSA can play a more influential behind-the-scenes role than the inhabitant of Foggy Bottom. For instance, during the Bush administration Condoleezza Rice acted in a manner akin to the President’s trouble-shooter (Woodward, 2003) and her influence may well have surpassed that of the Secretary of State.

                The OMB is by far the least significant agency within the EOP. It merely has two functions, to advise the President on how to allocate federal funding and to scrutinize federal spending. In terms of the impact upon presidential power, the Director of the OMB must be able to sell the President’s program to members of Congress and in a broader sense the American people. A notable case study to consider is Richard Darman, who persuaded George Bush senior to break his pledge not to raise taxes. In retrospect, the Bush administration never truly recovered from that decision. 

Historical overview

                When assessing the relationship between President Obama and Capitol Hill, it can at times be beneficial to consider the broader historical context. If one were to identify a comparable era, then the Truman administration of the late-1940s springs readily to mind. Expressing a sense of frustration with the obstructionism of the GOP, Truman famously described the eightieth congressional session (1947-49) as the “do-nothing Congress.” He could do little to persuade Congress to accept key elements of his agenda, particularly in the field of domestic policy. Obama has also faced intransigence and hostility from congressional Republicans. This obstructionism reflects the ideological fervor of the Tea party, and the failure of moderates within the GOP to halt the rightward drift within the party.

                Another comparable era is the partisan bickering that characterized the relationship between the Republican presidents of Nixon/Ford and the Democrat-controlled Congress. Relations between the two parties were particularly antagonistic at this time. The ‘imperial presidency’ had come crashing to a halt in the quagmire of Vietnam and the self-inflicted wound of Watergate. Congress was utterly determined to wrestle power back from the executive branch, even in the field of foreign policy where the Head of State traditionally operates with considerable scope. Democrats within Congress were also smarting at the end of the New Deal coalition, fearing that Richard Milhous Nixon marked the shape of things to come in terms of Republican hegemony. By the middle of that difficult decade, Ford claimed with good reason that the President was now imperiled rather than imperial. Even Carter (who was at least from the same party as most members of Congress) faced major problems with Congress over energy policy and the economy.

                Obama cannot govern in the same manner of say Ronald Reagan because he lacks the skills of the ‘great communicator,’ nor does he have many liberal Republicans to appeal to. That said; even Reagan faced opposition from the Democrat-controlled Congress under the formidable House Speaker Tip O’Neill. Obama might more accurately be compared to Bill Clinton, a fellow Democrat who also faced stiff opposition from Republicans within Congress. Relations between Clinton and the House Speaker Newt Gingrich were generally poor. Some claim that the government shutdown of the mid-1990s was actually a result of Gingrich being snubbed on a trip back on Air Force One. Whether one chooses to believe this or not, it certainly captures the bad feeling of the time.

                In terms of his public image, Obama has at least avoided some of the mistakes made by Clinton. For instance, the Lincoln bedroom is no longer available to donors and Obama has been reluctant to use his powers of pardon wealthy donors in a manner that so discredited Clinton. Obama has also avoided the personal indiscretions that ultimately harmed the Clinton presidency; in that valuable time was wasted fighting a number of accusations made against the forty-second President. Finally, Obama managed to make better use of his brief period of unified government than Clinton ever did. There is no better contrast than the issue of universal health care. To put it bluntly, Obama succeeded where Clinton failed. Obama presented a much clearer plan than Clinton and also managed to secure support from reluctant members of his own party via the use of pork (such as the Cornhusker kickback given to Senator Ben Nelson).

                It is a fairly safe assumption that Obama must envy the situation that faced George W. Bush during the first six years of his presidency. Bush junior had considerable support from Republicans within Congress, thereby enabling him to push through his blend of military Keynesianism and compassionate conservatism. This was more noticeable in the field of foreign policy, where a largely acquiescent Congress endorsed various measures taken in regards to the war against terror. Remarkably, George W. Bush became the first President since the Civil War not to issue a veto during his first term. However, the comparison between Obama and Bush remains pertinent here if one were to consider the last two years of his time in office. 

The relationship between the President and those on the Hill remains a difficult one. This is an important point to recognize in order to properly assess the presidency of Barack Obama. Thus far, Obama’s record might be rated comparatively well. His legislative success rate is high, he has secured his legacy via Obamacare and he certainly came off best in the budget stand-off with House Republicans. However, it will inevitably take time before one can properly assess the Obama administration in terms of its dealings with Capitol Hill. The level of appreciation or criticism of Barack Obama requires a proper detached level of historical hindsight. 

The relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill

The relative success of the President rests to a significant extent upon the association between Congress and the White House. This in turn is shaped by a number of factors, the most important of which is the level of ideological polarization between the two main parties. Since the collapse of the New Deal, the Democrats have become more liberal and the Republicans have become more conservative. As a consequence, the President is perceived of in partisan terms rather than as a neutral Head of State. It is worth noting here that Obama has been the most polarizing President since records began, although this may well reflect the intransigence of conservative Republicans as opposed to Obama's supposedly hardline liberal agenda.

                The stage of the electoral cycle must also be considered. It is a truism of American politics that the authority of the President diminishes over time. During the first one hundred days, the President can effectively shape the tone and character of his first term. He may even benefit from the coattails effect, as in the case of Reagan in 1980 or Obama in 2008. Over time however, the gap between results and initial promises tends to increase. To quote Obama, the President inevitably shifts from “yes we can” to “yes we can, but!” Moreover, the party of the President nearly always loses seats during mid-term elections. By the latter stages of the second-term, the President may well become something of a lame-duck figure (as was the case with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush). In some cases, he may even be forced to govern via the veto pen. After the 2014 mid-terms, Obama now faces a Republican-controlled House and Senate.

                Related to the above point is the state of the parties within the legislative branch. It is an undeniable observation about American politics that the President has a greater ability to shape the political agenda when his party is in control of both chambers. Take the case of Barack Obama. His legislative success rate during the first two years of his presidency was impressive by historical standards. However, issues such as the budget and the ACA have been particularly acrimonious since the GOP gained control of the lower chamber in the 2010 mid-terms.

The President’s approval ratings will also affect the relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill. As a general rule of thumb, Congress is more likely to defy the President at a time when he is unpopular with the American people. In contrast, a popular President usually has a greater capacity to persuade members of Congress. For example, George W. Bush managed to implement a number of anti-terrorism policies at a time when his approval ratings soared in the aftermath of 9/11. Such measures would have almost certainly been resisted by Congress under different circumstances, particularly if the Democrats had been the dominant party in Congress.

                The final factor to consider is the impact of events. The relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill is subject to the constant whirligig of events. One of the golden rules of Washingtonian politics is that the President should never let a crisis go to waste. Those who can turn a crisis into an opportunity tend to enhance or at least maintain their grip on power, but those who cannot seem to invite yet more mishaps upon their presidency. During times of national crisis, the President may well gain added support from members of both parties on the Hill. This is particularly notable during a time in which the nation is under threat from unpredictable enemy forces. Congressional members may well be inclined to support the White House in order to assuage the concerns of their constituents. At the very least, they would not wish to be thought of as unpatriotic when the nation is vulnerable to attack. Those Presidents who have gone down in history as embattled figures (such as Nixon and Carter) have often been defeated by a crisis. Nixon for instance never really recovered from the Watergate scandal whilst Carter was fatally discredited by the Iranian hostage crisis. Even now, the Nixon presidency is tainted by the events of Watergate whereas the very words ‘Jimmy Carter’ are a by-word for presidential failure. It is also worth noting that forging relations with members on the Hill can become more complex during a time when the nation feels relatively safe from external threat (as was the case under Clinton during the 1990s).

                Before we leave this section, it must be noted that none of the factors mentioned above necessarily spells disaster for any administration, provided the President can persuade others to adopt a particular course of action. He can of course engage in pork-barrel politics, or exploit his personal links with prominent members of Congress. Another key factor is the ability of the President to wrong-foot their opponents. For instance, during the budget stand-off in October 2013 President Obama managed to portray fiscal conservatives in the GOP in a negative light. If one were to take a cynical view, the President had an incentive to play hard-ball because it made the GOP appear beholden to a right-wing minority. It also exposed divisions between the TP’ers and more moderate, establishment figures within the Republican Party.

The power to persuade

                The political commentator and presidential advisor Richard Neustadt once said that the power of the President is “the power to persuade and the power to bargain.” As a long-time observer of American politics, there is in my opinion much veracity in this famous comment. A successful President must be able to convince others to support a particular course of action. This requires a mastery of the dark arts of persuasion in which he must wield an iron fist inside the velvet glove. One should include both hard power and soft power (Nye, 1990) here because no President can be successful without the ability to use brute force and tactful diplomacy. As the twenty-sixth President Theodore Roosevelt once said; the POTUS should always “speak softly and carry a big stick.”

                The President of the United States holds considerable hard power on the world stage. For instance, he has an extraordinary level of military arsenal at his disposal. As commander-in-chief of the world’s foremost military force; the President can wield significant power within international relations. However, the possession of force does not necessarily mean that the United States can always get its own way. The limitations of America’s military power were graphically brought home to people’s living rooms via CNN and other media sources during Vietnam. The Vietnam syndrome remains a scar upon the collective consciousness of our country, and has repeatedly shaped America’s response to various conflicts ever since. Time and time again, America has sought allies in whatever capacity we can when serious consideration has been devoted towards military intervention (Steward and Knaus, 2011). Presidents from both parties have sought to build coalitions of the willing rather than engage in unilateral military action. Despite what many critics of American foreign policy would claim, we have been eager to gain support from the international community wherever it has been practical and reasonable to do so.

                America also possesses a significant degree of soft power. The promise of more open trade and/or greater levels of aid from the United States can be a strong bargaining chip for the President. Whilst he must forge alliances in Congress to deliver such promises, the POTUS can still utilize considerable economic resources at his disposal to persuade other countries to agree with a particular course of action. Indeed, the use of economic aid and sanctions can be a highly effective tool of persuasion. America’s diplomatic resources could also be considered here, as in the case of the deal struck with Iran during January 2016.

                To adopt the language of the Italian political theorist Vilfredo Pareto, a successful President needs to be both a cunning fox and a forceful lion. In recent times, President Obama has demonstrated his diplomatic skills when dealing with our allies and in threatening action against hostile leaders such as Vladimir Putin of Russia and General Bashar al-Assad of Syria. His success in the area of foreign policy has thus far been somewhat mixed. Whereas Obama managed to hold together a number of countries over Libyan airstrikes in 2011, he failed to gain enough support from NATO allies over proposed military action against the Assad regime. He has since admitted that Libya remains his biggest foreign policy regret.

                Any proper assessment of the President’s ability to persuade within the field of international relations requires us to consider the broader framework of public opinion and congressional funding. Support for military action amongst the public is based upon mood rather than ideological substance. Whilst the US remains committed to the defense of freedom, it no longer faces anything like the same ideological opposition of say Communism or Fascism. As such, the American public does not have the same attachment to the loosely-defined war against terror as they had during the cold war or the Second World War. This makes it all the more difficult for the President to rally the country behind him when American interests might best be served by the use of force. On a related point, America can longer afford to act as the world’s policeman and must inevitably seek to identify ways in which it can reduce military spending. After a massive increase in military expenditure during the Bush administration, the emphasis under the Obama presidency has been upon attempts to reduce the level of military spending.

                The power of the President to persuade members of Congress will always be limited. He cannot offer anything comparable to the same incentives that a party leader could in a parliamentary system. Indeed, even the promise of promotion to the Cabinet is hardly an enticing offer for those on the Hill. Moreover, the President does not enjoy the same level of party discipline that would be the case in the United Kingdom. The President may also face an opposition party being in control of Congress, who may be ideologically hostile to his plans. Due to all these factors, his ability to persuade congressional members is heavily constrained.

                It is an inevitable fact of political life that some Presidents are more successful at persuading members of Congress than others. It must also be noted that the ability of the Head of State to reach out beyond the aisle has become much more difficult due to the trend towards ideological polarization. In the case of the current occupant, Barack Obama has found it difficult to reach a consensus in favor of foreign policy action due to the obstructionist tactics of the GOP. Many Republicans in the House are instinctively opposed to the liberal interventionism of the Obama administration. Bipartisanship remains the ‘holy grail’ for modern Presidents, fated only to surface on a fleeting basis when the national interest is at stake.

The President and foreign policy

Put simply, the President can exert his influence over foreign policy-making to a manner inconceivable in the domestic realm. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, he is the only person who can claim to be commander-in-chief of the military. To quote Gerald Ford; “our forefathers knew you could not have five hundred and thirty-five commanders-in-chief.” Secondly, only the executive branch of government has the ability to make pressing decisions in the event of a genuine crisis. The third factor is parochialism within Congress itself; particularly in the House.

This being America, the POTUS is still constrained to some extent by Congress in regards to foreign policy-making. As is widely known, the Senate can refuse to ratify any Treaty signed by the President and can also block diplomatic appointments. Members from both chambers will inform the President of their views on a proposed course of action and exert pressure upon the executive. Moreover, they can engage in a level of scrutiny that will always have the potential to embarrass the President. However, Congress does little in terms of actually directing the course of American foreign policy. These observations hold true even in the context of events since the congressional fight-back of the 1970s. The only direct power the legislature holds is the ability to limit or refuse funding. For instance, the Bush administration had to withdraw American involvement in Iraq as a response to the demands of a Democrat-controlled Congress from 2007 to 2009.

In stark contrast to the domestic realm, Congress has been relatively deferential to the President on the issue of national security. This is particularly notable during an era of unified government, when most members of Congress might well share the President’s wider philosophy or outlook. It is also worth noting that the concept of executive supremacy in regards to American foreign policy is based upon a long-standing judicial ruling (US v. Curtiss-Wright (1936)). Moreover, the courts have been reluctant to consider cases overtly concerned with foreign policy. Even when they do, all the Supreme Court does is rule against the administration when it has been judged to have acted unconstitutionally. Crucially, the courts cannot enforce such decisions and must wait for cases to be bought to their attention. During the noughties, one might consider Rasul v. Bush (2004) in which the Court ruled that those classed as enemy combatants (a term closely associated with Dick Cheney) were not outside the jurisdiction of the United States. In retrospect, the ruling did remarkably little to curtail the powers of the President in regards to Gitmo Bay.

As with much else in political life, the choice of comparison may well determine our eventual conclusion. Certainly by the standards of other comparable democracies, the extent to which Congress exerts influence over the making of foreign policy is relatively high. However, successive Presidents have acted in an imperial manner in regards to foreign policy on many occasions. Indeed, there has rarely been a time when the Head of State has not been able to gain powers for itself or in terms of avoiding full accountability for its actions. Take the case of drone strikes under the Obama administration. Whilst the use of drone strikes during his presidency may have actually exceeded his constitutional powers, Congress has spent little time scrutinizing the activities of such orders. Indeed, drone strikes have to some extent become ‘normalized’ through regular usage and a lack of sufficient congressional interest.

                The recent case study presented by America’s response to Syria in 2013 is worthy of close examination here. After the alleged use of chemical warfare by the Assad regime, Obama appeared to threaten military action on the basis of humanitarian intervention. However, he was careful to rule out “placing boots on the ground.” Obama also spent a considerable amount of time seeking support within Congress, cancelling a meeting with G8 leaders in St. Petersburg in order to 'work the phones' and seek support on the Hill. It is testimony to the constraints facing the Head of State that Barack Obama needed to spend so much time and effort on securing support within the legislature. It is also revealing to note that he needs the assistance of leading congressional figures such as those who sit on the Foreign Relations Committee.

                The reluctance of Congress to support military action in Syria alludes to a problem not of President Obama’s making, but of his predecessor. Quite frankly, the shadow of the Bush administration hangs heavy over possible US involvement in Syria. Members of Congress (and the American people) are understandably reluctant to engage in another potential quagmire akin to Iraq or Afghanistan. There is also a financial constraint to consider here. As Obama has readily acknowledged; America can no longer afford to be the world’s policeman. Finally, Obama has also been thrown off by external events over which he has very little control; as with the British parliament refusing to grant permission to Prime Minister David Cameron. The support of our traditional ally may well have generated a groundswell of opinion for military action against Syria.

Dependent factors

                There are several factors that determine the level of power held by the President. Of these, the most important is public perception of the threat posed to national security. The American public will in times of great uncertainty instinctively look to the President for leadership and decisive action. As commander-in-chief, Head of State and the only figure with a nationwide mandate; this is surely to be expected. From a historical perspective, it is interesting to note that the powers of the President tend to increase during times when the national appears to be under threat. Since the turn of the century, one would only have to consider the power grab implemented by the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11. The Patriot Act is emblematic of a time when the American people felt a genuine sense of fear and uncertainty. One can also identify examples from previous occupants of the White House, such as FDR in the case of World War Two and Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War. On the flip side, any President who fails to offer protection in an uncertain world will always appear weak (as in the case of Jimmy Carter and his botched handling of the Iranian hostage crisis).

                The second factor to consider is the stage of the presidential cycle itself. The power and authority of the President is always greater during the early stages of his time in office. However, by the fourth-quarter of the game the President’s power and authority will be in decline. For one, the public may well feel dissatisfied at the gap between capabilities and expectations. Moreover, his authority amongst congressional figures will be limited because he will not be standing again for elected office. A President is more likely to get things done during the early stages, such as during the symbolic first one hundred days of his time in the Oval Office.

                The third dependent factor is the state of the parties on Capitol Hill. Put crudely, it is easier to push forward his agenda during a time of unified government as opposed to divided government. As such, the legislative success rate of any given President will for understandable reasons be higher during a time of unified government. During Obama’s first two years in power, he actually achieved the best legislative success rate since LBJ back in the 1960s. Yet having said this, the President will always need to engage in the dark arts of persuasion in order to ensure that his own congressmen upholds the party line. The aforementioned LBJ was notorious for his arm-twisting abilities; using methods that ranged from outright physical threats to the shameless use of pork-barrel politics.

                Public opinion is another important element to consider. In order to exert power effectively, the President needs to act in a decisive manner whilst avoiding any of the negative connotations Americans have with imperial rule (such as the IRS targeting groups affiliated with the Tea Party movement). This is a difficult balancing act for any occupant of the Oval Office, having to appear strong whilst avoiding any accusation that he is acting in the manner of a King. For obvious reasons, the President is always more sensitive to the wishes of the people in the run-up to an election. By his second-term (particularly after the mid-terms), he is usually more concerned with his legacy than pleasing public opinion. Moreover, he doesn't even need to keep potential donors happy – which again provides greater freedom for maneuver.

                Another factor to consider is the Constitution itself. The President is both empowered and constrained by enumerated powers and implied powers. It must however be noted here that the POTUS has at times been able to evade the limits of the Constitution, particularly when the nation needs a man of action in an uncertain and troubling world. The powers of the President are also shaped by the ever-changing dynamics of international relations. For all our military might, both Iraq and Afghanistan have graphically exposed America’s limitations – just as Vietnam exposed our limitations and by implication the powers of our Head of State during an earlier era.

                Before we leave the whole arena of presidential power; any proper assessment needs to be placed into its proper context. This may include the intentions of the founding fathers, comparable liberal democracies and the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. For instance, it must be noted that the Constitution seeks to limit the power of the President via a system of checks and balances. One could also compare the POTUS with other world leaders, particularly those who are President in a democratic-republican system. However, it is the distinction between the domestic and foreign which casts the most valuable light upon our inquiry. It is undoubtedly the case that the President has greater scope to influence American foreign policy than the domestic sphere. As domestic policy was considered in previous posts, this would seem an opportune moment for the next entry to consider the powers of the President within the field of foreign policy.

The dual presidency

                There are two other theories of presidential power to consider. The dual presidency thesis is associated with an article penned by the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. As the term implies, Wildavsky claims that we should analyse two presidencies (that of domestic policy and foreign policy). The President has of course more freedom to maneuver on the world stage than he does in the domestic sphere; where his hands are invariably tied and he must forge alliances with members of Congress. It should also be noted that public backing for the President can often be greater in the field of foreign policy than the domestic sphere.

                The dual presidency thesis was more prevalent in academia during the cold war. Since then, it has largely fallen out of favor because the influence of domestic factors upon American foreign policy has become more pronounced. Most informed commentators accept that the distinction between domestic affairs and foreign policy is much more blurred than it was in the past. In short, domestic considerations do not merely stop at the water’s edge. Furthermore, modern-day Presidents cannot assume that Congress will adopt an acquiescent approach to their activities upon the world stage. What Lyndon Johnson secured from Congress during the Vietnam War is simply no longer available to modern-day occupants of the White House – even during a period of unified government. Whilst the dual presidency thesis provokes thought, academic debate is still centered upon the imperial-imperiled argument.

Imperiled thesis

                The claim that the President is actually imperiled rather than imperial derives from the thirty-eighth President of the United States Gerald Ford. As with Schlesinger, the timing of the observation is highly pertinent. Historically, Ford was unusual in that he gained the highest office in the land with no democratic legitimacy whatsoever. He was not even on the presidential ticket of 1972. Vice-president Spiro Agnew resigned before he got the opportunity to become President due to a charge of tax evasion. Ford therefore took over a discredited Republican administration. Moreover, he faced a significant level of hostility from the Democrat-controlled Congress. Proving that ideological polarization and partisan bickering is nothing new, the relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill was very hostile with many prominent congressional Democrats on Nixon’s enemies list. Thirdly, this was an era characterized by the congressional fight-back against the perceived excesses of the imperial presidency. Quite frankly, Ford could hardly have taken over in worse circumstances.

                In order to substantiate the imperiled line of argument, one might consider the various limitations upon the Head of State. Taking each branch of government in turn, the legislative branch holds eight checks upon the power of the President. The judiciary can also limit the powers of the President on the basis of judicial review. The legislative and judicial branch can also remove the President via the process of impeachment. More prosaically, the President may find it difficult to impose his authority over the executive branch of government due to rivalries within the administration itself. Finally, the President is and always will be constrained by public opinion.

                Ford’s comment about an imperiled presidency was a direct retort to Schlesinger’s claim that the US had an imperial presidency. The very fact that both arguments were made in space of a few years of each other illustrates just how quickly things can change in politics. The Prez. can go from ‘hero to zero’ (and back again!) in a relatively short space of time. Moreover, he is rarely in control of what might be called ‘events.’ A great deal of what faced Gerald Ford as he moved into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue was not directly of his own making. Indeed, some commentators might reasonably claim that Gerald Ford did the best he could under difficult circumstances not of his own making. It is always difficult to govern without any direct mandate from the people regardless of the democratic system in question. However, in the American system the Democrat-controlled Congress had every opportunity to limit what Gerald Ford (a Republican) could actually do.

Imperial presidency thesis

                Any discussion about the presidency inevitably shifts at some point towards an assessment of his overall power. As previously mentioned, the President of the United States is widely depicted as the most powerful politician in the world. However, there is much that constrains the Head of State – particularly in the realm of domestic policy. This is most notable during a period of divided government, a situation that has confronted Obama since the GOP won the House mid-terms in 2010.

Those who claim the President is a very powerful figure cite the imperial presidency thesis of Arthur Schlesinger. The imperial presidency thesis was put forward in the early-1970s. The timing of the publication is important because it captures an era in which the powers of the President had grown over time. In doing so, it was claimed that the original intentions of the founding fathers had been circumvented by successive occupants of the White House. Schlesinger identified foreign policy as the key determinant in the expansion of the powers of the President. The scope and scale of America’s military arsenal had grown substantially both as a result of the Second World War and the cold war. Alongside this unprecedented growth, successive figures had to some extent undermined the Constitution and in a broader sense the conventions that characterize the American system. Take the case of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He broke the convention set by George Washington that no President could serve more than two consecutive terms. He also imposed restrictions of civil liberties (including internment of Japanese Americans) to tackle the war effort. In later years, Lyndon Johnson managed to gain congressional approval to take “all necessary measures” to deal with the Vietnam War. From the Republican side, Nixon had been guilty of exceeding his constitutional authority in regards to the break-in at the Watergate building. This ‘imperial’ attitude was best summarized in Nixon’s response to a question from the British reporter Sir David Frost over Watergate (“when the President does it then it is not illegal”). It is hard to imagine a comment less in keeping with the intentions of the founding fathers than that!

                In order to substantiate Schlesinger’s argument further, one might consider the various sources of presidential power. In regards to the legislative branch, he can propose legislation via the State of the Union address or during a press conference. He can also submit an annual budget to Congress, sign legislation passed by Congress or conversely veto an item of proposed legislation. In regards to the executive branch, the President nominates members of his Cabinet and other related officials. In terms of the judicial branch, the President can nominate judges to the Supreme Court and for many other judicial posts. These nominations must gain the approval of the upper chamber.

                The President also wields considerable power in the field of American foreign policy. Most notably, he is commander-in-chief of the world’s leading military power. It is worth noting here that the Presidents’ legacy is often defined by foreign policy. Notable examples include the Star Wars Initiative under Ronald Reagan and Nixon’s attempt to split the Communist bloc via establishing diplomatic relations with China. The President also represents the United States on the world stage; which enables him to raise issues with other world leaders and sign international Treaties on behalf of the nation. In times of emergency, the President also has direct control over the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). To take a recent example, FEMA was employed by Barack Obama in response to Hurricane Irene. Finally, the President can pardon felons.

                Taken together, the enumerated and implied powers at the disposal of the President are substantial. However, we must also consider the counter-argument which depicts the President as an embattled figure whose powers are constrained by the Constitution and by a system of governance centered upon the separation of powers. This is known as the imperiled presidency argument.

Hail to the chief!

                In regards to the presidency, the founding fathers of our great nation established a Republic rather than adopt the old world practice of monarchical rule. As a direct consequence, the President of the United States (POTUS) is the Head of State but he is not the head of government. Unlike other republican regimes such as France, the US does not have a Prime Minister either. The nearest equivalent we have is the Speaker of the House. The Speaker can of course derive from the opposing party to the President, a situation that can also occur under the French system. What the French call cohabitation we call divided government.

                As Head of State, the POTUS represents us on the world stage. As leader of our country, he holds considerable prestige and authority within international relations. Indeed, the American President has the strongest claim to being leader of the free world. He is also the leader of the largest economy in the world, at least in nominal terms rather than Gross Domestic Product per capita. Whilst the US remains far ahead of any other challenger in terms of military power, we may lose out to China if current trends continue. It is already the case that a great deal of American debt is owned by China, which inevitably constrains the President when negotiating with the Chinese Premier (currently Xi Jinping). These economic trends matter because the authority of the President within international affairs is tied into the relative status of the United States. When America’s position declines, the President’s authority is likely to suffer accordingly.

                As Head of State, the President is obliged to adopt a number of ceremonial roles. This requires him to act in a politically neutral manner. However, given the partisan atmosphere of American politics he is also expected to act in a certain way by his own party (especially during the run-up to an election). Even the ceremonial aspects of the role may be performed in a different manner according to which particular party he is from. Indeed, it would be naïve to assume that the actions of the President, even the ceremonial aspects; can be entirely free from political bias.

Quotes on Congress

“Americans have the best Congress money can buy.” Ted Kennedy

“Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, while Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at work.” Woodrow Wilson

“Congress is a bastion of negation.” Professor Denenberg

“Congress is so strange. A man gets up to speak and says nothing. Nobody listens – and then everyone disagrees.” Alexander Wiley

“It’s a lot easier to kill legislation than pass legislation.” Dan Quayle

“Leadership is difficult precisely because the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be so.” Cronin and Genovese

“Our Congress today is a forum for legalized bribery.” Thomas Friedman

“The voting card we hold in our pocket belongs to our people back home.” Allen Boyd

“Though the President is commander-in-chief, Congress is his commander.” Thaddeus Stevens

“What can I do? What can I even get passed in the Senate?” Harry Reid

“You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” Rahm Emanuel

“You will wonder how the hell you got here, and after that you will wonder how the hell the rest of us got here.” Senator J. Hamilton Lewis to Harry Truman 

Vetoes and congressional override

The system of checks and balances between Capitol Hill and the White House ensures that no one branch can entirely dominate. This permeates all aspects of governance within our nation’s capital; including that of the presidential veto (which consists of a return veto and a pocket veto). If the President exercises his veto powers, he must return the proposed legislation to the chamber that first considered it with a note explaining his objections. Congress then has the muscle to override the presidential veto provided they can secure a supermajority. Pocket vetoes however cannot be overridden.

During a period of divided government, the relationship between the two branches can descend into stalemate. At its very worst, the President might appear to govern via the veto pen. This was the position Bill Clinton found himself in after the ‘Republican revolution’ of 1994. A historical parallel could be made with the situation facing Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford during the so-called congressional fight-back of the 1970s. During this particular era, Congress sought to reassert its power in relation to the imperial presidency. As one might expect, the number of vetoes issues was particularly high. Gerald Ford had no less than twelve of his forty-eight vetoes overridden, which may have led to his sardonic comment concerning the existence of an imperiled presidency.

The Nixon/Ford era highlights the importance of the broader political context of presidential vetoes and congressional overrides. Relations between the Republican White House and the Democrat-controlled Congress had turned sour at this point. Many congressional Democrats were on Nixon’s enemies list, Ford did not possess any democratic legitimacy from the ballot box (he didn’t even appear on the presidential ticket as a vice-presidential candidate!) and Nixon himself would have almost certainly been impeached over Watergate if he had not actually resigned. If we were to extract three themes from this example; it would be the governing style of the President, the existence of united/divided government and the stage of the presidential cycle. Let us consider each in turn.

In terms of governing style, it has to be said that some Presidents are able to persuade in a more convincing manner than others. Although Reagan did experience nine congressional overrides, he also managed to develop a constructive working relationship with congressional Democrats (particularly conservative Democrats from the south). Whereas Clinton held many of the persuasive qualities of the ‘great communicator,’ his persona did not endear him to the Republicans under Newt Gingrich. One reason for this was ideological polarization, which to this day remains a noted feature of relations between the White House and Capitol Hill.

                The significance of unified or divided government is self-evidently an important aspect to consider. During the noughties, George ‘Dubya’ Bush was quite fortunate in terms of the state of the parties in Congress. He benefited from unified government for most of his time in office, and the fact that many Republicans shared his conservative agenda. George W. Bush became the first President since the Civil War not to use his veto powers during his first term. In contrast, his father had to deal with a hostile Congress.

                It is a statistical fact that a presidential veto is more likely to arise during the lame-duck stage of the presidential cycle. The authority of the President inevitably wanes as he approaches the end of his time in office. When the lame-duck stage is combined with divided government; the Head of State might be reduced to governing via the veto pen (particularly over domestic matters). George W. Bush offers a very stark illustration of this point; particularly the contrast between the immediate post-9/11 situation to that after the 2006 mid-terms when the Democrats gained control of both chambers.

                In regards to the Obama administration, there have been two vetoes at the time of writing. Neither was overridden by Congress. In 2009, Obama had a number of factors that played in his favor. Firstly, the Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress. Secondly, a number of Democrats had been elected on the basis of the coattails effect, thereby strengthening his hand. Thirdly, his party held a sufficient majority within the upper chamber to prevent any potential filibuster from members of the GOP. Finally, his political capital was high during the early stages of the presidential cycle. The key turning-point for Obama was the 2010 congressional mid-terms, when the GOP gained control of the House. Given the ideologically polarized and poisoned atmosphere of Washington DC, Obama has found it difficult to reach out beyond the aisle. 

The party system within Congress

As with all political institutions, the party system in Congress is based on a hierarchical structure. Congressional leaders include the majority leader and the minority leader in each chamber. Similarly, the Speaker of the House may also be considered. In the upper chamber the veep performs the same role as the Speaker of the House, but he is not conventionally thought of as a congressional leader because of the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature.

Congressional leaders invariably owe their position due to support gathered from within their own party. This may entail a range of qualities ranging from diplomacy to ideological purity. Similarly, those who maintain their position will have to navigate the greasy pole of politics. They are often vulnerable to a challenge from someone further to the left (in the case of a Democrat) or further to the right (in the case of a Republican). This inevitably makes adopting a bipartisan platform all the more difficult. For instance, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan must adopt a fairly belligerent stance with President Obama in part because he is vulnerable to a challenge from supporters of a more right-wing candidate. The obvious consequence of ‘over-your-shoulder’ politics is the difficulty presented when seeking to reach out beyond the aisle.

In recent years, seasoned observers of congressional politics have claimed that freshmen tend to be more ideological than older members. When they replace longer-serving congressional members, the overall tone of congressional politics becomes ever more partisan and ideological. Although identifying a turning point in congressional politics is somewhat subjective, the 1994 Republican freshmen were distinctly more ideological than previous generations. It must also be noted that incumbents who are perceived of by the party base as willing to compromise on their party’s beliefs are often vulnerable to defeat in a primary contest. A notable example to consider here is Richard Lugar; who came third during the GOP’s primary for Indiana after thirty-six years continuous service as a Senator. On a less dramatic level, congressional members who are labelled as RINOs or DINOs can find it hard to climb up the ladder. As most politicians seek power, this is self-evidently an important point to grasp. Within Congress, those who vote along party/ideological lines are simply more likely to gain promotion than those who do not.

The relationship between congressional leaders inevitably impacts upon the manner in which business is conducted on Capitol Hill. For instance, the Speaker of the House may come to be associated with a strident partisan tone that exacerbates conflict between the two parties. This was the charge levied against both Newt Gingrich (R) and Nancy Pelosi (D). The former was a conservative counter-revolutionary who railed against the moral pollution of liberal-secularism, whereas Pelosi was criticized for ignoring the seniority rule in order to promote the so-called ‘friends of Nancy’ to committee chairs. Majority and minority leaders are often culpable of adopting an ‘us and them’ attitude towards congressional business, when the whole system of governance necessitates bipartisan compromise to get things done.

The effectiveness of congressional leadership fluctuates over time and could be said to be dependent upon several factors. Of these, perhaps the most important is the state of party unity. Congressional leaders can do very little without the support of their party members. This may also be linked to the level of ideological coherence within Congress. Personality also plays a key role here. Some congressional leaders are more persuasive than others, and some are just better at using sanctions (such as promotion to a committee) than others. From the opposing side, the impact of pressure groups can be a considerable counter-force. A member of Congress may therefore place greater emphasis upon special interests as opposed to congressional leaders. One might also consider the influence of fund-raisers, their local constituents and so on. Personal beliefs will also play a role, and these may at times result in a member of Congress diverting from the agreed party line.

Congressional committees

The main work of Congress occurs within committees. Bills are amended, powerful figures are scrutinised and back-room deals are made in order to push the agenda forward. In contrast, the floor of the chamber is subject to debate and discussion of that which has already been presented to them via standing committees. Indeed, on the floor of the Senate very few members may be in attendance. If we also include conference committees, the overall significance of congressional committees is striking. As the twenty-eighth President Woodrow Wilson once said; “Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, while Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at work.”

As with other aspects of Congress, the committee system is hierarchical. A committee chair is in relative terms a major player on Capitol Hill. He or she can determine within certain boundaries the remit of the committee work and who might gain a seat on that particular committee. Freshmen will seek a position on a committee closest to their (or their constituents) interest. Gaining a seat on a committee awards power to a member of Congress, enabling them to get things done and perhaps more importantly claim credit for a useful amendment. Once appointed to a committee, members are often reluctant to leave. This reflects the informal seniority rule that operates in the corridors of Capitol Hill. According to the seniority rule, the committee member with the most experience should gain the top position. Critics however have called this the senility rule. Moreover, congressional leaders (including the Speaker of the House) have some level of flexibility here.

The personal chemistry and dynamics between senior members of congressional committees and the executive is of considerable importance to the policy-making process. A senior member of a congressional committee might try to persuade their members to adopt a particular line in return for favors from the executive branch. In the US, no one branch of government entirely dominates. Compromise and bargaining is therefore central towards the law-making process, and indeed central to how things are done in Washington DC. The style of the President is also worth touching upon here. Obama has delegated a great deal of this task to Joe Biden. Obama lacks the contacts that Biden does on Capitol Hill, and lacks the ‘personal touch’ of his veep. However, Bill Clinton was more hands-on. In politics as in everyday life, personality types can make a difference.

The party in control of Congress will have the majority of members (and the majority of chairs) within a committee. During a period of divided government, committees have a clear interest in adopting a more critical stance in relation the executive. As such, they will investigate areas and ask questions that are more likely to cause political damage to the President. Under unified government, this is far less likely to occur. Many of the most dramatic investigations into the executive (such as the House of Un-American Activities, the Fulbright committee into Vietnam and the investigation chaired by Carl Levin into the Iraq war) have occurred during a period of divided government. Yet having said this, there is usually some attempt within committees to resolve party differences. Frankly, it makes more of a statement when a committee publishes a report or issues its findings on a bipartisan platform. Partisan divisions within a committee inevitably weaken the impact of that particular committee.

Some committees are of course more significant than others. For instance, the House Rules Committee plays a major role within the lower chamber. It effectively decides which bills will be heard on the floor of the House and in congressional committees. It also decides which bills will be pigeonholed because Congress simply does not have enough time to hear all of them. Similarly, the conference committee plays a very important role when stalemate occurs between the two chambers. Conference committees are optional and could be criticized for their secretive and undemocratic character. That said, they may well offer an escape route from a difficult impasse – particularly when one party is in control of one chamber and the opposing party is in control of the other. Moreover, some committees are more important than others simply as a result of the areas in which they consider (such as the budget, nominations to the judicial branch or matters of national security).

As discussed in the opening section, the two most important roles performed by the legislature are scrutiny and law-making. In both cases, congressional committees play a very important role. Members of the executive, nominees to the judicial branch and other powerful figures are routinely held to account within committees. This may well occur in public view, which might therefore generate further media interest and thus provide even greater significance to the work of such committees. Similarly, the most important stage of the law-making process occurs within committees. These committees can also wield a negative power, in that potential legislation may well be defeated or severely amended within a committee. The overall importance of congressional committees is confirmed yet further by the observation that interest groups tend to concentrate their activities upon members of congressional committees. One must also recognize that committees hear cases that will ultimately decide the way government programs are funded. Inevitably, this places committee members in a powerful position in terms of distributing pork. Having said all this, congressional committees rarely make the final decisions on a proposed item of legislation.