The President and foreign policy

Put simply, the President can exert his influence over foreign policy-making to a manner inconceivable in the domestic realm. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, he is the only person who can claim to be commander-in-chief of the military. To quote Gerald Ford; “our forefathers knew you could not have five hundred and thirty-five commanders-in-chief.” Secondly, only the executive branch of government has the ability to make pressing decisions in the event of a genuine crisis. The third factor is parochialism within Congress itself; particularly in the House.

This being America, the POTUS is still constrained to some extent by Congress in regards to foreign policy-making. As is widely known, the Senate can refuse to ratify any Treaty signed by the President and can also block diplomatic appointments. Members from both chambers will inform the President of their views on a proposed course of action and exert pressure upon the executive. Moreover, they can engage in a level of scrutiny that will always have the potential to embarrass the President. However, Congress does little in terms of actually directing the course of American foreign policy. These observations hold true even in the context of events since the congressional fight-back of the 1970s. The only direct power the legislature holds is the ability to limit or refuse funding. For instance, the Bush administration had to withdraw American involvement in Iraq as a response to the demands of a Democrat-controlled Congress from 2007 to 2009.

In stark contrast to the domestic realm, Congress has been relatively deferential to the President on the issue of national security. This is particularly notable during an era of unified government, when most members of Congress might well share the President’s wider philosophy or outlook. It is also worth noting that the concept of executive supremacy in regards to American foreign policy is based upon a long-standing judicial ruling (US v. Curtiss-Wright (1936)). Moreover, the courts have been reluctant to consider cases overtly concerned with foreign policy. Even when they do, all the Supreme Court does is rule against the administration when it has been judged to have acted unconstitutionally. Crucially, the courts cannot enforce such decisions and must wait for cases to be bought to their attention. During the noughties, one might consider Rasul v. Bush (2004) in which the Court ruled that those classed as enemy combatants (a term closely associated with Dick Cheney) were not outside the jurisdiction of the United States. In retrospect, the ruling did remarkably little to curtail the powers of the President in regards to Gitmo Bay.

As with much else in political life, the choice of comparison may well determine our eventual conclusion. Certainly by the standards of other comparable democracies, the extent to which Congress exerts influence over the making of foreign policy is relatively high. However, successive Presidents have acted in an imperial manner in regards to foreign policy on many occasions. Indeed, there has rarely been a time when the Head of State has not been able to gain powers for itself or in terms of avoiding full accountability for its actions. Take the case of drone strikes under the Obama administration. Whilst the use of drone strikes during his presidency may have actually exceeded his constitutional powers, Congress has spent little time scrutinizing the activities of such orders. Indeed, drone strikes have to some extent become ‘normalized’ through regular usage and a lack of sufficient congressional interest.

                The recent case study presented by America’s response to Syria in 2013 is worthy of close examination here. After the alleged use of chemical warfare by the Assad regime, Obama appeared to threaten military action on the basis of humanitarian intervention. However, he was careful to rule out “placing boots on the ground.” Obama also spent a considerable amount of time seeking support within Congress, cancelling a meeting with G8 leaders in St. Petersburg in order to 'work the phones' and seek support on the Hill. It is testimony to the constraints facing the Head of State that Barack Obama needed to spend so much time and effort on securing support within the legislature. It is also revealing to note that he needs the assistance of leading congressional figures such as those who sit on the Foreign Relations Committee.

                The reluctance of Congress to support military action in Syria alludes to a problem not of President Obama’s making, but of his predecessor. Quite frankly, the shadow of the Bush administration hangs heavy over possible US involvement in Syria. Members of Congress (and the American people) are understandably reluctant to engage in another potential quagmire akin to Iraq or Afghanistan. There is also a financial constraint to consider here. As Obama has readily acknowledged; America can no longer afford to be the world’s policeman. Finally, Obama has also been thrown off by external events over which he has very little control; as with the British parliament refusing to grant permission to Prime Minister David Cameron. The support of our traditional ally may well have generated a groundswell of opinion for military action against Syria.