Vetoes and congressional override

The system of checks and balances between Capitol Hill and the White House ensures that no one branch can entirely dominate. This permeates all aspects of governance within our nation’s capital; including that of the presidential veto (which consists of a return veto and a pocket veto). If the President exercises his veto powers, he must return the proposed legislation to the chamber that first considered it with a note explaining his objections. Congress then has the muscle to override the presidential veto provided they can secure a supermajority. Pocket vetoes however cannot be overridden.

During a period of divided government, the relationship between the two branches can descend into stalemate. At its very worst, the President might appear to govern via the veto pen. This was the position Bill Clinton found himself in after the ‘Republican revolution’ of 1994. A historical parallel could be made with the situation facing Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford during the so-called congressional fight-back of the 1970s. During this particular era, Congress sought to reassert its power in relation to the imperial presidency. As one might expect, the number of vetoes issues was particularly high. Gerald Ford had no less than twelve of his forty-eight vetoes overridden, which may have led to his sardonic comment concerning the existence of an imperiled presidency.

The Nixon/Ford era highlights the importance of the broader political context of presidential vetoes and congressional overrides. Relations between the Republican White House and the Democrat-controlled Congress had turned sour at this point. Many congressional Democrats were on Nixon’s enemies list, Ford did not possess any democratic legitimacy from the ballot box (he didn’t even appear on the presidential ticket as a vice-presidential candidate!) and Nixon himself would have almost certainly been impeached over Watergate if he had not actually resigned. If we were to extract three themes from this example; it would be the governing style of the President, the existence of united/divided government and the stage of the presidential cycle. Let us consider each in turn.

In terms of governing style, it has to be said that some Presidents are able to persuade in a more convincing manner than others. Although Reagan did experience nine congressional overrides, he also managed to develop a constructive working relationship with congressional Democrats (particularly conservative Democrats from the south). Whereas Clinton held many of the persuasive qualities of the ‘great communicator,’ his persona did not endear him to the Republicans under Newt Gingrich. One reason for this was ideological polarization, which to this day remains a noted feature of relations between the White House and Capitol Hill.

                The significance of unified or divided government is self-evidently an important aspect to consider. During the noughties, George ‘Dubya’ Bush was quite fortunate in terms of the state of the parties in Congress. He benefited from unified government for most of his time in office, and the fact that many Republicans shared his conservative agenda. George W. Bush became the first President since the Civil War not to use his veto powers during his first term. In contrast, his father had to deal with a hostile Congress.

                It is a statistical fact that a presidential veto is more likely to arise during the lame-duck stage of the presidential cycle. The authority of the President inevitably wanes as he approaches the end of his time in office. When the lame-duck stage is combined with divided government; the Head of State might be reduced to governing via the veto pen (particularly over domestic matters). George W. Bush offers a very stark illustration of this point; particularly the contrast between the immediate post-9/11 situation to that after the 2006 mid-terms when the Democrats gained control of both chambers.

                In regards to the Obama administration, there have been two vetoes at the time of writing. Neither was overridden by Congress. In 2009, Obama had a number of factors that played in his favor. Firstly, the Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress. Secondly, a number of Democrats had been elected on the basis of the coattails effect, thereby strengthening his hand. Thirdly, his party held a sufficient majority within the upper chamber to prevent any potential filibuster from members of the GOP. Finally, his political capital was high during the early stages of the presidential cycle. The key turning-point for Obama was the 2010 congressional mid-terms, when the GOP gained control of the House. Given the ideologically polarized and poisoned atmosphere of Washington DC, Obama has found it difficult to reach out beyond the aisle.